Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Time and Identity$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke, and Harry S. Silverstein

Print publication date: 2010

Print ISBN-13: 9780262014090

Published to MIT Press Scholarship Online: August 2013

DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262014090.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM MIT PRESS SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.mitpress.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright The MIT Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in MITSO for personal use.date: 17 October 2019

Persistence and Responsibility

Persistence and Responsibility

Chapter:
(p.149) 7 Persistence and Responsibility
Source:
Time and Identity
Author(s):

Neal A. Tognazzini

Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:10.7551/mitpress/9780262014090.003.0126

This chapter examines the question regarding what persistence through time amounts to. That individuals persist through time is not in question. Rather, this chapter will delve into a genuine metaphysical dispute that asks: Do persons persist, on the one hand, by enduring through time, or do they persist by perduring through time? The relationship between the debate over persistence and another philosophical thesis stating that persons are at least sometimes morally responsible for their actions is also explored. Persons who perdure through time cannot be held morally responsible for anything. Although texts on the compatibility of perdurance and moral responsibility are brief, this chapter aims to expand on these in order to see what arguments can be found for the incompatibility claim.

Keywords:   persistence, metaphysical dispute, perdurance, moral responsibility, incompatibility claim

MIT Press Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs, and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us.