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Arguments as Relations$
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John Bowers

Print publication date: 2010

Print ISBN-13: 9780262014311

Published to MIT Press Scholarship Online: August 2013

DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262014311.001.0001

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Derived Nominals

Derived Nominals

(p.165) 5 Derived Nominals
Arguments as Relations

John Bowers

The MIT Press

This chapter extends the theory of argument structure proposed earlier to derived nominals and shows that, despite differences between sentential and nominal structures, both feature the same basic argument categories. It examines how Affectee arguments are realized in the nominal system and argues that certain classic problems such as the Affectedness Constraint can be insightfully reframed within the proposed approach. The chapter also analyzes non-event nominals in English and their interaction with compounding, showing that only one type of nominal corresponds to each of the argument categories Agent, Theme, and Affectee. Such nominals are formed by derivational affixes that are simply realizations of the argument categories themselves. The chapter concludes by implying that derivational morphology and compounding are fundamentally syntactic in nature.

Keywords:   Affectee, argument structure, derived nominals, Affectedness Constraint, non-event nominals, derivational affixes, argument categories, derivational morphology, compounding

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