Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Causing Human ActionsNew Perspectives on the Causal Theory of Action$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Jesús H. Aguilar and Andrei A. Buckareff

Print publication date: 2010

Print ISBN-13: 9780262014564

Published to MIT Press Scholarship Online: August 2013

DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262014564.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM MIT PRESS SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.mitpress.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright The MIT Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in MITSO for personal use.date: 28 February 2021

Comments on Clarke’s “Intentional Omissions”

Comments on Clarke’s “Intentional Omissions”

Chapter:
(p.156) (p.157) 10 Comments on Clarke’s “Intentional Omissions”
Source:
Causing Human Actions
Author(s):

Sartorio Carolina

Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:10.7551/mitpress/9780262014564.003.0083

This chapter focuses on arguments for intentional omissions as presented by Randolph Clarke, which has two main claims, the first of which states that, in order for an agent’s omitting to A to be intentional, some intention with the appropriate content must play a causal role in the situation. The second claim presents the notion that the relevant intention’s causal role in each case is causing the agent’s subsequent thought and action. This is followed by a few remarks regarding both claims individually. The first presented claim made by Clarke is, however, the main source of dissent here. The chapter argues that the agent’s omitting to intend to A causes his omitting to A, and that this is enough to explain why the agent’s omitting to A is intentional. It is not required to state that the agent’s formation of a certain intention also plays a causal role.

Keywords:   intentional omissions, causal role, agent, intentions

MIT Press Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs, and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us.