Reply to Sartorio
Reply to Sartorio
In response to the claims made in the previous chapter, this chapter questions the claim made by Carolina Sartorio regarding the right account of intentional omission and how it does not parallel a causal theory of action, and poses the question, “if this is the case, does it make trouble for causalism as an attempt to explain what it is for an agent to behave intentionally?” Sartorio’s account of intentional omission is a causalist one since she contends that a paradigmatic intentional omission is caused by one’s omission to intend. This is a flawed argument because it attempts to account for one omission’s intentionality by appealing to yet another omission’s intentionality. Also, the notion of intentionally omitting to intend is a rather vague notion, and Sartorio fails to provide sufficient clarification for it.
Keywords: intentional omission, causal theory of action, causalism, paradigmatic intentional omission, omission to intend
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