Teleology and Causal Understanding in Children’s Theory of Mind
Teleology and Causal Understanding in Children’s Theory of Mind
This chapter discusses Donald Davidson’s claim that there is an “insuperable problem in giving a full description of the emergence of thought,” and how he expresses relief at not working “in the field of developmental psychology.” This claim is reiterated here and it is argued that Davidson was correct regarding the depth and difficulty of the problems involved in describing the emergence of thought. It should first be clarified, however, that this chapter is not concerned with Davidson’s completely general problem regarding the “conceptual difficulty” involved in the very idea of attributing propositional attitudes to immature thinkers. Although Davidson expressed pessimism at the possibility of making progress with these problems, this chapter endeavors to show that describing the emergence of thought may help to shed light on the nature of thought.
Keywords: emergence of thought, Donald Davidson, developmental psychology, conceptual difficulty, propositional attitudes, immature thinkers, nature of thought
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