Action Theory Meets Embodied Cognition
Action Theory Meets Embodied Cognition
This chapter is primarily concerned with embodied cognition, which is becoming a popular perspective in the field of cognitive science. This chapter examines the problem caused for the received view by the claim that much of embodied cognition is situated and time-pressured in such a way that the received view of how intentions work in the production of actions in these cases cannot be correct. The general framework of embodied cognition is motivated by the idea that the mind and cognition are for action and, consequently, cognitive processing is rooted and grounded in sensory and motor processing. A compatibility approach will be defended here, arguing that even if action is time-pressured and situated, the requirements of the received view can still be met.
Keywords: embodied cognition, cognitive science, intentions, mind, cognition, cognitive processing, compatibility approach, received view
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