Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Causing Human ActionsNew Perspectives on the Causal Theory of Action$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Jesús H. Aguilar and Andrei A. Buckareff

Print publication date: 2010

Print ISBN-13: 9780262014564

Published to MIT Press Scholarship Online: August 2013

DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262014564.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM MIT PRESS SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.mitpress.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright The MIT Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in MITSO for personal use.date: 27 February 2021

Action Theory Meets Embodied Cognition

Action Theory Meets Embodied Cognition

(p.229) 15 Action Theory Meets Embodied Cognition
Causing Human Actions

Adams Fred

The MIT Press

This chapter is primarily concerned with embodied cognition, which is becoming a popular perspective in the field of cognitive science. This chapter examines the problem caused for the received view by the claim that much of embodied cognition is situated and time-pressured in such a way that the received view of how intentions work in the production of actions in these cases cannot be correct. The general framework of embodied cognition is motivated by the idea that the mind and cognition are for action and, consequently, cognitive processing is rooted and grounded in sensory and motor processing. A compatibility approach will be defended here, arguing that even if action is time-pressured and situated, the requirements of the received view can still be met.

Keywords:   embodied cognition, cognitive science, intentions, mind, cognition, cognitive processing, compatibility approach, received view

MIT Press Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs, and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us.