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EnactionToward a New Paradigm for Cognitive Science$
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John Stewart, Olivier Gapenne, and Ezequiel A. Di Paolo

Print publication date: 2010

Print ISBN-13: 9780262014601

Published to MIT Press Scholarship Online: August 2013

DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262014601.001.0001

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(p.vii) Introduction

John Stewart

Olivier Gapenne

Ezequiel A. Di Paolo

The MIT Press

The aim of this book is to present the paradigm of enaction as a framework for an all-encompassing renewal of cognitive science as a whole. There have been many critiques of classical, first-generation cognitivism based on the Computational Theory of Mind (CTM). This book explores new paths instead of going over already covered ground. Enaction, initially articulated as a program for understanding cognition, makes a radical break from the formalisms of information-processing and symbolic representations prevalent in cognitive science. Within this program, cognition is grounded in the sensorimotor dynamics of the interactions between a living organism and its environment in contrast to the classical scheme, which relegates perception to a preliminary “module” based on sensory input alone. This is followed by “cognitive” planning, representations of goals, and ultimately, the decision to act.

Keywords:   paradigm of enaction, cognitive science, CTM, information-processing, symbolic representations, sensorimotor dynamics, perception, sensory input

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