The Ontological Constitution of Cognition and the Epistemological Constitution of Cognitive Science: Phenomenology, Enaction, and Technology
The Ontological Constitution of Cognition and the Epistemological Constitution of Cognitive Science: Phenomenology, Enaction, and Technology
This chapter proposes a review of the major analyses of Husserlian phenomenology in order to show how this renews the questions of the Ontological Constitution of Cognition (OCC), the Epistemological Constitution of Cognitive Science: Phenomenology, Enaction, and Technology (ECCS), and their relation. On this basis, it proposes a new view of the possible relations between phenomenology and cognitive science, quite different from the “naturalization of phenomenology.” The work of the Perceptual Supplementation Group at the Technological University of Compiegne is used here as a figure of speech to show how taking into account the proposition above can renew the relation between phenomenology and contemporary cognitive science, where the two are clearly differentiated from each other while sources of mutual stimulation are also provided for each.
Keywords: cognitive science, Husserlian phenomenology, OCC, ECCS, naturalization of phenomenology, Perceptual Supplementation Group
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