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EnactionToward a New Paradigm for Cognitive Science$
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John Stewart, Olivier Gapenne, and Ezequiel A. Di Paolo

Print publication date: 2010

Print ISBN-13: 9780262014601

Published to MIT Press Scholarship Online: August 2013

DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262014601.001.0001

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Toward a Phenomenological Psychology of the Conscious

Toward a Phenomenological Psychology of the Conscious

(p.386) (p.387) 14 Toward a Phenomenological Psychology of the Conscious

Benny Shanon

The MIT Press

This chapter outlines a new framework for the psychological study of the conscious. Essentially, the greater part of contemporary psychology and cognitive science is so concerned with the unconscious that the view dominating the field today is that the bulk of workings of the mind take place in a province which is not amenable to consciousness. This holds true of all major paradigms in cognitive science, such as the classical paradigm of symbolic processing or the representational-computational view of mind (RCVM), the alternative paradigm of connectionism, as well as models entertained in social psychology and in the neurosciences. By all these approaches, both the structures underlying cognitive activity and the processes that produce cognitive performance pertain to a covert level of which the cognitive agent is generally not aware.

Keywords:   conscious, cognitive science, consciousness, symbolic processing, RCVM, connectionism

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