Free Will: Some Bad News
Free Will: Some Bad News
This chapter focuses on two unconventional claims regarding the free will problem. The first contends that the systematical integration of the partial but crucial insights both of compatibilism and of hard determinism must be achieved so that one ultimately becomes a compatibilist hard determinist, and the second insists on a central role played by illusion in the free will problem, one which is mostly positive. The former argues that philosophers should be free from the so-called “Assumption of Monism,” which forces one to choose between compatibilism and hard determinism. This will make it possible to explore when, how, and how much of each side can be integrated to form a better argument. The latter, on the other hand, argues the centrality of illusion, which has been, for the most part, overlooked.
Keywords: free will problem, compatibilism, hard determinism, compatibilist hard determinist, illusion, Assumption of Monism, centrality of illusion
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