Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Action, Ethics, and Responsibility$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke, and Harry S. Silverstein

Print publication date: 2010

Print ISBN-13: 9780262014731

Published to MIT Press Scholarship Online: August 2013

DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262014731.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM MIT PRESS SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.mitpress.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright The MIT Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in MITSO for personal use.date: 22 January 2022

Selective Hard Compatibilism

Selective Hard Compatibilism

(p.149) 8 Selective Hard Compatibilism
Action, Ethics, and Responsibility

Paul Russell

The MIT Press

This chapter discusses the compatibilist view that is focused on examining the nature of the capacities required for freedom and moral responsibility. The difficulty this view faces lies in the description of a plausible alternative theory which is more satisfying than the classical view that freedom is simply a matter of being able to do as one pleases or act according to the determination of one’s own will. To address this, many influential contemporary philosophers who subscribe to the compatibilist view have placed emphasis on developing an account of “rational self-control” or “reasons-responsiveness.” Reasons-responsive views have two key components. First, a rational agent must be able to recognize the reasons that are available to or present in the situation; second, an agent must be able to “translate” those reasons into decisions and choices which guide conduct.

Keywords:   compatibilist view, freedom, moral responsibility, rational self-control, reasons-responsiveness

MIT Press Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs, and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us.