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Laws, Mind, and Free Will$
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Steven Horst

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780262015257

Published to MIT Press Scholarship Online: August 2013

DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262015257.001.0001

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Three Appeals and a Kantian Conclusion

Three Appeals and a Kantian Conclusion

(p.120) (p.121) 9 Three Appeals and a Kantian Conclusion
Laws, Mind, and Free Will

Steven Horst

The MIT Press

This chapter presents three replies to the argument that being committed to scientific laws does not entail a commitment to determinism and hence is compatible with free will. First, there are appeals to other scientific principles. These concede that acknowledging the aptness of some law, or even some set of laws, does not entail determinism. Second, there are appeals to the future which acknowledge that the sciences as we currently understand them do not entail determinism or prohibit free will. Third, there are appeals to mystery. These admit that our present scientific understanding of the world does not commit us to determinism or prohibit free will, and that we might not be able to produce an “ideally completed science” which would do so, perhaps on Cognitive Pluralist grounds.

Keywords:   scientific laws, determinism, free will, scientific principles, appeals to mystery, ideally completed science, Cognitive Pluralist grounds

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