Comments by William Poole
Comments by William Poole
This chapter is composed of the insights on how to restore calm and stability after the financial crisis of 2008. Though the chapter may agree with much of the content of the previous chapters, there remain certain disagreements. This chapter mentions an essential topic that is lacking in previous chapters: the consideration of public-choice aspects of this policy area. The core failure, as perpetuated by this chapter, is not from regulatory failure, but in economic analysis. No party seemed to understand the risks and consequences of declining house prices. Regulatory reform, then, should be viewed as emphasizing statutory revision and not enlarging regulatory discretion. The chapter questions Glenn Hubbard’s argument that international coordination is necessary for reform, because this is practically impossible. The chapter’s solution, then, is that the U.S. act unilaterally when necessary.
Keywords: public-choice aspects, regulatory failure, economic analysis, declining house prices, statutory revision, Glenn Hubbard
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