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Optimal Control Theory with Applications in Economics$
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Thomas A. Weber

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780262015738

Published to MIT Press Scholarship Online: August 2013

DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262015738.001.0001

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Mechanism Design

Mechanism Design

Chapter:
(p.207) 5 Mechanism Design
Source:
Optimal Control Theory with Applications in Economics
Author(s):

Thomas A. Weber

Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:10.7551/mitpress/9780262015738.003.0005

This chapter reviews the basics of static mechanism design in settings where a principal faces a single agent of uncertain type. The aim of the resulting screening contract is for the principal to obtain the agent’s type information in order to avert adverse selection, maximizing her payoffs. Nonlinear pricing is discussed as an application of optimal control theory.

Keywords:   static mechanism design, screening contract, nonlinear pricing, optimal control theory

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