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Managing Institutional ComplexityRegime Interplay and Global Environmental Change$
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Sebastian Oberthür and Olav Schram Stokke

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780262015912

Published to MIT Press Scholarship Online: August 2013

DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262015912.001.0001

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Savings Clauses and the “Chilling Effect”

Savings Clauses and the “Chilling Effect”

Regime Interplay as Constraints on International Governance

Chapter:
(p.87) 4 Savings Clauses and the “Chilling Effect”
Source:
Managing Institutional Complexity
Author(s):

Mark Axelrod

Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:10.7551/mitpress/9780262015912.003.0004

This chapter focuses on the bias of interplay management techniques in international law toward status quo preservation and international change. Hypothesis about conflict with international trade rules resulting in the chilling of environmental treaties is examined, along with the use of saving clauses to determine whether certain situations will yield a chilling effect or not. Analysis of the data set reveals acknowledgement of some form of international law by multilateral agreements, which shows that every environmental treaty is not an independent event. Institutional interaction hierarchies and their relationship with the chilling effect are also explored.

Keywords:   interplay management, environmental treaties, chilling effect, multilateral agreements, institutional interactions

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