Similarity and Species Concepts
Similarity and Species Concepts
This chapter presents a theory of species referred to as “kind-conceptions” of species that understands species as kinds or concepts. This usage does not suggest that an individual can ever be a concept, but rather that this view of species regards them as individuals. In this chapter, species “concepts” are meant to refer to “conceptions” since they are conceptions of what species are. Similarity plays a major part in adopting a kind-conception of species, and it is argued here that the rejection of the view that species are groups of organisms united conceptually by similarity relationships is mistaken. Not only is the similarity conception superior to the biological, ecological, or evolutionary conception, any kind-based conception of species must ultimately be based on similarity relationships of some sort.
Keywords: theory of species, kind-conceptions of species, species concepts, conceptions, similarity relationships
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