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Carving Nature at Its JointsNatural Kinds in Metaphysics and Science$
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Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke, and Matthew H. Slater

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780262015936

Published to MIT Press Scholarship Online: August 2013

DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262015936.001.0001

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How to Think about the Free Will/Determinism Problem

How to Think about the Free Will/Determinism Problem

Chapter:
(p.313) 14 How to Think about the Free Will/Determinism Problem
Source:
Carving Nature at Its Joints
Author(s):

Kadri Vihvelin

Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:10.7551/mitpress/9780262015936.003.0014

This chapter proposes an approach to the free will/determinism problem that addresses the issue of whether the apparent conflict between free will and determinism is real or not. According to common sense, man has free will; when a person makes a choice, he or she indeed has the choice thought to be had. However, who is to say that the choices one makes are not predetermined? For all we know, determinism might be true. Common sense either is not aware of, or does not take seriously, the thought of determinism. Nevertheless, as soon as a philosopher explains the thesis of determinism, common sense sees the problem: the truth of determinism means the absence of free will.

Keywords:   free will/determinism problem, common sense, choice, predetermined, free will, determinism

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