Mindreading Animals: The Debate over What Animals Know about Other Minds
Robert W. Lurz
Abstract
Animals live in a world of other minds, human and nonhuman, and their well-being and survival often depends on what is going on in the minds of these other creatures. But do animals know that other creatures have minds? And how would we know if they do? This book offers a fresh approach to the hotly debated question of mental-state attribution in nonhuman animals. Some empirical researchers and philosophers claim that some animals are capable of anticipating other creatures’ behaviors by interpreting observable cues as signs of underlying mental states; others claim that animals are merely cle ... More
Animals live in a world of other minds, human and nonhuman, and their well-being and survival often depends on what is going on in the minds of these other creatures. But do animals know that other creatures have minds? And how would we know if they do? This book offers a fresh approach to the hotly debated question of mental-state attribution in nonhuman animals. Some empirical researchers and philosophers claim that some animals are capable of anticipating other creatures’ behaviors by interpreting observable cues as signs of underlying mental states; others claim that animals are merely clever behavior-readers, capable of using such cues to anticipate others’ behaviors without interpreting them as evidence of underlying mental states. The book argues that neither position is compelling, and proposes a way to move the debate, and the field, forward. It presents a new approach to understanding what mindreading in animals might be, offering a bottom-up model of mental-state attribution that is built upon cognitive abilities which animals are known to possess rather than on a preconceived view of the mind applicable to mindreading abilities in humans. It goes on to describe an innovative series of new experimental protocols for animal mindreading research that overcome a persistent methodological problem in the field, known as the “logical problem” or “Povinelli’s challenge.” These protocols show in detail how various types of animals—from apes to monkeys to ravens to dogs—can be tested for perceptual state and belief attribution.
Keywords:
mental states,
nonhuman animals,
perceptual state,
mindreading,
cognitive abilities,
logical problem,
Povinelli’s challenge,
humans,
mind,
belief
Bibliographic Information
Print publication date: 2011 |
Print ISBN-13: 9780262016056 |
Published to MIT Press Scholarship Online: August 2013 |
DOI:10.7551/mitpress/9780262016056.001.0001 |