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Like-MindedExternalism and Moral Psychology$
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Andrew Sneddon

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780262016117

Published to MIT Press Scholarship Online: August 2013

DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262016117.001.0001

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The Disunity of Moral Judgment

The Disunity of Moral Judgment

(p.25) 2 The Disunity of Moral Judgment

Andrew Sneddon

The MIT Press

This chapter examines moral judgment, a central topic for the majority of philosophical moral psychology today. It presents three vignettes accompanied by three questions that raise the issues of pluralism, externalism, and action about moral judgment. It argues that moral judgments can arise not only from reason and emotion but also from other psychological phenomena, that one person’s emotion can be a part of another person’s capacity to make moral judgments, and that moral judgment is intimately related to the production of action. The chapter also looks at some prominent theories of moral judgment, focusing on the works of Shaun Nichols, Marc Hauser, Jesse Prinz, and Jonathan Haidt.

Keywords:   Shaun Nichols, Marc Hauser, Jesse Prinz, Jonathan Haidt, moral judgment, moral psychology, pluralism, externalism, action, emotion

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