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Like-MindedExternalism and Moral Psychology$
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Andrew Sneddon

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780262016117

Published to MIT Press Scholarship Online: August 2013

DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262016117.001.0001

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Moral Reasoning

Moral Reasoning

(p.71) 3 Moral Reasoning

Andrew Sneddon

The MIT Press

This chapter explores moral reasoning and argues that it is widely realized, taking place centrally and literally (but not solely) between people. It first provides a sketch of the Wide Moral Systems Hypothesis view of moral reasoning before turning to some important research programs that focus on moral reasoning, focusing on their emphasis—if any—on social interaction. It then examines the views of Jean Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg on morality and moral reasoning, Jonathan Haidt’s account of moral reasoning, experimental philosophy as an approach to the study of moral reasoning, moral dumbfounding and its social aspects, and prospects for empirical assessment of the social dependence hypothesis. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the work of Joshua Knobe and Erica Roedder on the folk concept of valuing.

Keywords:   Wide Moral Systems Hypothesis, moral reasoning, social interaction, Jean Piaget, Lawrence Kohlberg, morality, Jonathan Haidt, experimental philosophy, moral dumbfounding, social dependence hypothesis

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