Moral Responsibility
Moral Responsibility
This book aims to demonstrate the shortcomings of moral responsibility as a doctrine, despite being widely held. As developments in scientific research continue to pile up and as science continues to unveil the secrets of human behavior, belief in a system based on moral responsibility seems more and more implausible. This book targets the key arguments for moral responsibility and shows that moral responsibility is fundamentally inconsistent with the naturalistic world view, that people would be better off if they rejected moral responsibility, and that the abolition of moral responsibility is a genuine possibility. It should be noted that what is focused on here is the moral responsibility that justifies special reward and punishment; that which provides moral justification for singling an individual out for condemnation or commendation, praise or blame, reward or punishment.
Keywords: moral responsibility, human behavior, naturalistic world view, special reward, punishment, moral justification
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