Begging the Question for Moral Responsibility
Begging the Question for Moral Responsibility
This chapter focuses on systemic moral responsibility arguments that start from the assumption that we are naturally morally responsible and argue that because in our natural non-miraculous world people can meet the requirements for moral responsibility, the system itself is therefore naturalistically justified. The strong persuasiveness of such arguments can be seen in Harry Frankfurt’s argument against the alternate possibilities requirement for moral responsibility, which is one of the most famous arguments of that type. According to Frankfurt, “The principle of alternate possibilities is false. A person may well be morally responsible for what he has done even though he could not have done otherwise.” .
Keywords: systemic moral responsibility arguments, naturalistically justified, Harry Frankfurt, alternate possibilities requirement
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