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Against Moral Responsibility$
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Bruce N. Waller

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780262016599

Published to MIT Press Scholarship Online: August 2013

DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262016599.001.0001

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Begging the Question for Moral Responsibility

Begging the Question for Moral Responsibility

(p.221) 12 Begging the Question for Moral Responsibility
Against Moral Responsibility

Bruce N. Waller

The MIT Press

This chapter focuses on systemic moral responsibility arguments that start from the assumption that we are naturally morally responsible and argue that because in our natural non-miraculous world people can meet the requirements for moral responsibility, the system itself is therefore naturalistically justified. The strong persuasiveness of such arguments can be seen in Harry Frankfurt’s argument against the alternate possibilities requirement for moral responsibility, which is one of the most famous arguments of that type. According to Frankfurt, “The principle of alternate possibilities is false. A person may well be morally responsible for what he has done even though he could not have done otherwise.” .

Keywords:   systemic moral responsibility arguments, naturalistically justified, Harry Frankfurt, alternate possibilities requirement

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