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The Consciousness ParadoxConsciousness, Concepts, and Higher-Order Thoughts$
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Rocco J. Gennaro

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780262016605

Published to MIT Press Scholarship Online: August 2013

DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262016605.001.0001

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In Defense of Conceptualism

In Defense of Conceptualism

(p.135) 6 In Defense of Conceptualism
The Consciousness Paradox

Rocco J. Gennaro

The MIT Press

This chapter focuses on the Conceptualism Thesis, which is based on the view that the content of perceptual experience is fully determined by concepts possessed by the subject. Related to this thesis is the nature of concept possession and the distinction between personal and subpersonal level content, which is discussed after providing an overview of conceptualism. The HOT theory and conceptualism shed light on each other through a special kinship and via an examination of the phenomena of ambiguous figures and visual agnosia. Conceptualism faces two phenomenological objections, namely, the richness of experience argument and the fineness of grain argument, both of which are addressed here. Finally, this chapter presents arguments supporting the notion that conceptualism is far more plausible than the alternative.

Keywords:   perceptual experience, Conceptualism Thesis, concept possession, HOT theory, visual agnosia, richness of experience argument, fineness of grain argument

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