Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds without Content
Daniel D. Hutto and Erik Myin
Abstract
Most of what humans do and experience is best understood in terms of dynamically unfolding interactions with the environment. Many philosophers and cognitive scientists now acknowledge the critical importance of situated, environment-involving embodied engagements as a means of understanding basic minds—including basic forms of human mentality. Yet many of these same theorists hold fast to the view that basic minds are necessarily or essentially contentful—that they represent conditions the world might be in. This book promotes the cause of a radically enactive, embodied approach to cognition ... More
Most of what humans do and experience is best understood in terms of dynamically unfolding interactions with the environment. Many philosophers and cognitive scientists now acknowledge the critical importance of situated, environment-involving embodied engagements as a means of understanding basic minds—including basic forms of human mentality. Yet many of these same theorists hold fast to the view that basic minds are necessarily or essentially contentful—that they represent conditions the world might be in. This book promotes the cause of a radically enactive, embodied approach to cognition which holds that some kinds of minds—basic minds—are neither best explained by processes involving the manipulation of contents nor inherently contentful. It opposes the widely endorsed thesis that cognition always and everywhere involves content. The authors defend the counter-thesis that there can be intentionality and phenomenal experience without content, and demonstrate the advantages of their approach for thinking about scaffolded minds and consciousness.
Keywords:
dynamically unfolding interactions,
embodied engagements,
basic minds,
human mentality,
cognition,
manipulation of contents,
intentionality,
phenomenal experience,
scaffolded minds,
consciousness
Bibliographic Information
Print publication date: 2012 |
Print ISBN-13: 9780262018548 |
Published to MIT Press Scholarship Online: August 2013 |
DOI:10.7551/mitpress/9780262018548.001.0001 |