The Multidisjunctive Conception of Hallucination
The Multidisjunctive Conception of Hallucination
This chapter asks: if one wishes to endorse a direct realist view of perception, in which in a case of seeing, seen objects or their particular features are somehow parts of the experience one undergoes, what other doctrines must one endorse? Direct realists think that we can't get a clear view of the nature of hallucinating. There are many epistemic possibilities to be had from a single hallucination. But if there are many epistemic possibilities for a single hallucination then there are also metaphysical possibilities for the hallucination that subjectively match it.
Keywords: direct realists, perception, experience, nature of hallucinating, epistemic possibilities, metaphysical possibilities
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