Congressional Committees and Monetary Policy
Congressional Committees and Monetary Policy
This chapter analyses the monetary policy oversight hearings of the two congressional banking committees from 1976 to 2009 (as well as the reconfirmation hearings for Volcker, Greenspan and Bernanke) in order to assess how well Congress holds the Fed to account for its decisions on monetary policy. Surprisingly, partisan ideology plays very little role when it comes to effective monetary policy oversight. Decade after decade, Fed chairman after Fed chairman, one feature is, however, evident in the discourse between central bankers and US legislators: Fed chairmen tend to talk about the technicalities of monetary policy while senators and representatives talk about other things, such jobs, fiscal policy, energy policy, education, and so on. All too often they simply talk past one another.
Keywords: Congress, Senate Banking Committee, House Financial Services Committee, Motivations of Members of Congress, Monetary policy
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