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Lessons from the Economics of CrimeWhat Reduces Offending?$
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Philip J. Cook, Stephen Machin, Olivier Marie, and Giovanni Mastrobuoni

Print publication date: 2013

Print ISBN-13: 9780262019613

Published to MIT Press Scholarship Online: May 2014

DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262019613.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM MIT PRESS SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.mitpress.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright The MIT Press, 2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in MITSO for personal use.date: 09 April 2020

COPS and Cuffs

COPS and Cuffs

1 COPS and Cuffs
Lessons from the Economics of Crime

Emily Greene Owens

The MIT Press

A large literature in economics and criminology has established that hiring more police officers will reduce crime. Using variation in police employment generated by the COPS grant program, this paper investigates the relative contribution of the two mechanisms by which this crime reduction may occur – deterrence and incapacitation. The main finding is that hiring more police officers does not necessarily result in more arrests for serious crimes, and does not appear to have resulted in higher levels of incapacitation overall.

Keywords:   Police, Arrests, Deterrence, Incapacitation

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