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The Economics of Conflict – Theory and Empirical Evidence - MIT Press Scholarship Online
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The Economics of Conflict: Theory and Empirical Evidence

Karl Wärneryd


Modern economics has largely ignored the issue of outright conflict as an alternative way of allocating goods, assuming instead the existence of well-defined property rights enforced by an undefined third party. And yet even in ostensibly peaceful market transactions, conflict exists as an outside option, sometimes constraining the outcomes reached through voluntary agreement. In this volume, economists offer a crucial rational-choice perspective on conflict, using methodological approaches that range from the game theoretic to the experimental. Several chapters use the recently developed cont ... More

Keywords: property rights, market transactions, voluntary agreement, contest success function, alliance formation, regional conflicts, fiscal federalism, coups d’etat, developing countries, economic growth

Bibliographic Information

Print publication date: 2014 Print ISBN-13: 9780262026895
Published to MIT Press Scholarship Online: September 2014 DOI:10.7551/mitpress/9780262026895.001.0001


Affiliations are at time of print publication.

Karl Wärneryd, editor

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