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The Economics of ConflictTheory and Empirical Evidence$
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Karl Wärneryd

Print publication date: 2014

Print ISBN-13: 9780262026895

Published to MIT Press Scholarship Online: September 2014

DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262026895.001.0001

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A Game of Thrones: Power Structure and the Stability of Regimes

A Game of Thrones: Power Structure and the Stability of Regimes

(p.79) 4 A Game of Thrones: Power Structure and the Stability of Regimes
The Economics of Conflict

Ruixue Jia

Pinghan Liang

The MIT Press

This chapter develops a model of the relationship between decentralization of government and political stability, and tests it on data on coups d’état in developing countries. In the model, citizens can choose between subordinating themselves to a central government or plotting a coup. Following ideas articulated already by Machiavelli, but hitherto largely ignored, the chapter considers the role of the internal organization of government in enabling commitment to non-aggression.

Keywords:   government decentralization, political stability, coups d’état, developing countries, internal organization, non-aggression

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