Psychopathy, Responsibility, and the Moral/Conventional Distinction
Psychopathy, Responsibility, and the Moral/Conventional Distinction
The chapter addresses an underlying assumption of ascriptions of moral responsibility: a capacity, or lack thereof, to distinguish between moral and conventional rules. The fractured nature of the distinction between the moral and the conventional is shown; on the other hand, one aspect of this difference is used for establishing a thesis about criminal responsibility. The author proposes a hybrid theory of responsibility, where criminal responsibility is possible without full moral responsibility.
Keywords: moral-conventional, rules, authority dependence, moral responsibility, criminal responsibility, practical reason
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