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Being AmoralPsychopathy and Moral Incapacity$
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Thomas Schramme

Print publication date: 2014

Print ISBN-13: 9780262027915

Published to MIT Press Scholarship Online: January 2015

DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262027915.001.0001

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Psychopathy, Responsibility, and the Moral/Conventional Distinction

Psychopathy, Responsibility, and the Moral/Conventional Distinction

Chapter:
(p.247) 11 Psychopathy, Responsibility, and the Moral/Conventional Distinction
Source:
Being Amoral
Author(s):

David W. Shoemaker

Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:10.7551/mitpress/9780262027915.003.0011

The chapter addresses an underlying assumption of ascriptions of moral responsibility: a capacity, or lack thereof, to distinguish between moral and conventional rules. The fractured nature of the distinction between the moral and the conventional is shown; on the other hand, one aspect of this difference is used for establishing a thesis about criminal responsibility. The author proposes a hybrid theory of responsibility, where criminal responsibility is possible without full moral responsibility.

Keywords:   moral-conventional, rules, authority dependence, moral responsibility, criminal responsibility, practical reason

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