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The Myth of the IntuitiveExperimental Philosophy and Philosophical Method$
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Max Deutsch

Print publication date: 2015

Print ISBN-13: 9780262028950

Published to MIT Press Scholarship Online: September 2015

DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262028950.001.0001

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The Evidence for the Evidence

The Evidence for the Evidence

Arguing for Gettier Judgments

(p.73) 4 The Evidence for the Evidence
The Myth of the Intuitive

Max Deutsch

The MIT Press

This chapter focuses on Gettier’s argument against the JTB theory of knowledge. Its central claim is that this argument is more complex than ordinarily recognized because Gettier not only argues against the JTB theory but also for the judgments that he makes about his famous cases. These subsidiary arguments rely on the notion of “epistemic luck.” The chapter points out, furthermore, that, in the aftermath of the publication of Gettier’s landmark paper, many others offered their own arguments for Gettier judgments and hence that the idea that it is “just intuition” that supports these judgments is a myth. The chapter closes by drawing a distinction between the producer and the consumer of a philosophical thought experiment. and uses this distinction to further criticize the view that intuitions play an important evidential role in philosophy The connection between this distinction and the view that thought experimentation is primarily abductive is also described.

Keywords:   Gettier, Abduction, Thought experiments, Epistemic luck

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