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Consciousness, Attention, and Conscious Attention$
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Carlos Montemayor and Harry Haroutioun Haladjian

Print publication date: 2015

Print ISBN-13: 9780262028974

Published to MIT Press Scholarship Online: September 2015

DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262028974.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM MIT PRESS SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.mitpress.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright The MIT Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in MITSO for personal use.date: 27 October 2021

Forms of Consciousness

Forms of Consciousness

(p.85) 3 Forms of Consciousness
Consciousness, Attention, and Conscious Attention

Carlos Montemayor

Harry Haroutioun Haladjian

The MIT Press

This chapter focuses on the philosophical theories about consciousness and how they might relate to our understanding of visual attention. By examining several theoretical considerations, a robust form of dissociation between consciousness and attention is apparent. It is argued that dissociation is not only a plausible view, but that the more severe forms of dissociation (e.g., Type-B or Type-C dissociations), seem to be entailed by the standard distinctions used in consciousness research. This approach helps disambiguate terms that need to be reconciled in order to improve exchanges between theorists, and also systematically unifies debates that have been largely isolated from one another. The account presented in this chapter reveals several affinities among the extant views that have not been properly understood. The chapter’s main conclusion is that many of the current debates show that a more comprehensive theory of consciousness and attention is needed, and that a dissociation between the twois an essential feature of this theory.

Keywords:   access conscious attention, access conscious normativity, cognitive integration, empathic normativity, epistemic agency, epistemic normativity, first-order theories, higher-order theories, phenomenal conscious attention, subsumptive attention

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