Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Against Facts$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Arianna Betti

Print publication date: 2015

Print ISBN-13: 9780262029216

Published to MIT Press Scholarship Online: January 2016

DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262029216.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM MIT PRESS SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.mitpress.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright The MIT Press, 2022. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in MITSO for personal use.date: 25 May 2022

Solving the Unity Problem

Solving the Unity Problem

(p.85) 3 Solving the Unity Problem
Against Facts

Arianna Betti

The MIT Press

Chapter 3 shows in what way the Unity Problem can be not only solved, but dissolved. The second and last step is taken here towards dismissing Armstrong’s facts as ad hoc entities, by showing that superior alternatives are available. If a common assumption that relations are relata unspecific is dropped (where relata specificity is neither externality or particularity), and it is instead assumed that relations are relata specific, then mereological complexes of relations and their relata alone suffice to provide unity in the world, and the unity problem does not arise. If the acknowledgement of relations (and properties) is deemed non-negotiable, then a world of mereological complexes where all relations are relata specific (and properties all bearer-specific) is preferable to one of Armstrongian facts, because the former is least ad hoc, or, in any case presents the fewest costs and most benefits. Within a discussion of criteria of theory choice in metaphysics it is also critically argued that, although mereological complexes can take up the truthmaker role, they do so only by sharing with facts certain modal characteristics that enable truthmaking as necessitation.

Keywords:   The unity problem, relations, relata-specific vs. relata-unspecific relations, internal vs. external relations, universal vs. particular relations, mereological complexes, Ad hocness, Theory choice in metaphysics, Truthmaking

MIT Press Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs, and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us.