A Fallback Position (1)
A Fallback Position (1)
In this and the following chapter a fallback position is explored under the assumption that there is, per absurdum, reference to facts via that-clauses taken to be singular terms (against the conclusion of chapter 4). The claim that factive that-clauses refer to facts while non-factive that-clauses refer to propositions is first put to test, to conclude that, even if that-clauses were singular terms, and factive that-clauses referred to facts, the facts in question could only be propositional facts. It turns out that there are no acceptable identity conditions for propositional facts such that we can avoid their collapsing into true propositions. On the basis of a working definition of propositional facts, the identity conditions for propositional facts are critically analysed, and no convincing case is found in favor of accepting propositional facts alongside (true) propositions. Five attempts at blocking the collapse of propositional facts into (true) propositions are shown to be ineffective.
Keywords: Propositional facts, Propositions, That-clauses, factive and non-factive, Reference, Identity conditions for facts
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