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Against Facts

Arianna Betti


Against facts argues that we have no good reason to accept facts in our catalog of the world, at least as they are described by the two major metaphysical theories of facts. Neither of these theories is tenable—neither the theory according to which facts are special structured building blocks of reality nor the theory according to which facts are whatever is named by certain expressions of the form “the fact that such and such.” There is reality, and there are entities in reality that we are able to name, but among these entities there are no facts. Drawing on metaphysics, the philosophy of la ... More

Keywords: Facts, Propositional facts, Compositional facts, Armstrong’s Truthmaker Argument, Argument from nominal reference, Quine-like criterion of ontological commitment, Philosophical methodology, Metaphysics, Philosophy of Language, Linguistics

Bibliographic Information

Print publication date: 2015 Print ISBN-13: 9780262029216
Published to MIT Press Scholarship Online: January 2016 DOI:10.7551/mitpress/9780262029216.001.0001


Affiliations are at time of print publication.

Arianna Betti, author
University of Amsterdam