From Evolution to Emotionese
From Evolution to Emotionese
This chapter focuses on intentionality, specifically, on how mental states acquire their intentional contents (their ‘aboutness’). In previous chapters it was noted that the affect expressions and STBPs of human neonates are interpreted as or function as assistance/attention soliciting devices by preadapted caregivers. Given this, the chapter focuses on theories of function and biosemantics (a naturalistic theory of intentionality). Both theories adopted are due to Millikan (1984, 2004); the first relates to Proper Function and, the second, to natural, intentional and linguistic signs. Her theory explains how one sign type can emerge from another through a bootstrapping process. The analyses demonstrate that representations are defined by the way they function, not just in the head, but in wider cognitive systems which include representation-producing devices, objects in the environment and representation-consuming devices.
Keywords: Proper function, Biosemantics, Intentional signs
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