- Title Pages
- Dedication
- Foreword
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction to Combinatorial Auctions
-
1 The Lovely but Lonely Vickrey Auction -
2 Iterative Combinatorial Auctions -
3 Ascending Proxy Auctions -
4 Simultaneous Ascending Auctions -
5 The Clock-Proxy Auction: A Practical Combinatorial Auction Design -
6 PAUSE: A Computationally Tractable Combinatorial Auction -
7 Pseudonymous Bidding in Combinatorial Auctions -
8 From the Assignment Model to Combinatorial Auctions -
9 Bidding Languages for Combinatorial Auctions -
10 Preference Elicitation in Combinatorial Auctions -
11 The Communication Requirements of Combinatorial Allocation Problems -
12 The Winner Determination Problem -
13 Tractable Cases of the Winner Determination Problem -
14 Optimal Winner Determination Algorithms -
15 Incentive Compatibility in Computationally Feasible Combinatorial Auctions -
16 Noncomputational Approaches to Mitigating Computational Problems in Combinatorial Auctions -
17 Observations and Near-Direct Implementations of the Ascending Proxy Auction -
18 A Test Suite for Combinatorial Auctions -
19 Empirical Hardness Models for Combinatorial Auctions -
20 Auctions for the Safe, Efficient, and Equitable Allocation of Airspace System Resources -
21 Combinatorial Auctions for Truckload Transportation -
22 Auctioning Bus Routes: The London Experience -
23 Industrial Procurement Auctions - Combinatorial Auction Glossary
- Contributors
- Author Index
- Subject Index
Tractable Cases of the Winner Determination Problem
Tractable Cases of the Winner Determination Problem
- Chapter:
- (p.319) 13 Tractable Cases of the Winner Determination Problem
- Source:
- Combinatorial Auctions
- Author(s):
Rudolf Müller
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
This chapter offers information on several approaches used for making the winner determination problem (WDP) solvable by putting restrictions on the bid prices. It begins with integer linear programming formulations of WDP in order to get a tractable case for the winner determination problem. The chapter then focuses on another approach that is used for making WDP a combinatorial optimization problem by using the intersection graph of bids. As reported, the latter approach leads to faster algorithms in comparison with the linear programming approach. The chapter further explains how other models such as restricting bid sets or bid values can become suitable methods for showing tractability. Limitations that can hamper the performance of these approaches including economic inefficiencies, incentive problems, and exposure problems.
Keywords: winner determination problem, bid prices, integer linear programming, algorithms, economic inefficiencies, exposure problems
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- Title Pages
- Dedication
- Foreword
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction to Combinatorial Auctions
-
1 The Lovely but Lonely Vickrey Auction -
2 Iterative Combinatorial Auctions -
3 Ascending Proxy Auctions -
4 Simultaneous Ascending Auctions -
5 The Clock-Proxy Auction: A Practical Combinatorial Auction Design -
6 PAUSE: A Computationally Tractable Combinatorial Auction -
7 Pseudonymous Bidding in Combinatorial Auctions -
8 From the Assignment Model to Combinatorial Auctions -
9 Bidding Languages for Combinatorial Auctions -
10 Preference Elicitation in Combinatorial Auctions -
11 The Communication Requirements of Combinatorial Allocation Problems -
12 The Winner Determination Problem -
13 Tractable Cases of the Winner Determination Problem -
14 Optimal Winner Determination Algorithms -
15 Incentive Compatibility in Computationally Feasible Combinatorial Auctions -
16 Noncomputational Approaches to Mitigating Computational Problems in Combinatorial Auctions -
17 Observations and Near-Direct Implementations of the Ascending Proxy Auction -
18 A Test Suite for Combinatorial Auctions -
19 Empirical Hardness Models for Combinatorial Auctions -
20 Auctions for the Safe, Efficient, and Equitable Allocation of Airspace System Resources -
21 Combinatorial Auctions for Truckload Transportation -
22 Auctioning Bus Routes: The London Experience -
23 Industrial Procurement Auctions - Combinatorial Auction Glossary
- Contributors
- Author Index
- Subject Index