- Title Pages
- Dedication
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
-
I Connectedness, Contagion, and Correlation: Definitions and a Review of the Economic Literature -
1 The Concept of Connectedness -
2 The Concept and History of Contagion -
3 The Concept of Correlation -
II Connectedness in the Crisis -
4 Asset Connectedness: Lehman and AIG -
5 Liability Connectedness: Money Market Funds and Tri-Party Repo Market -
6 Dodd–Frank Act Policies to Address Connectedness -
III Contagion -
7 Contagion in the 2008 Crisis: The Run on the Nonbank Sector, “Shadow Banks” -
8 History of Lender of Last Resort in the United States -
9 Dodd–Frank Restrictions on the Lender-of-Last-Resort Power -
10 Comparison of LLR Powers of Fed with Bank of England, European Central Bank, and Bank of Japan -
11 Strengthening the LLR Powers of the Fed -
12 Liability Insurance and Guarantees -
13 Insuring Money Market Funds -
IV Ex ante Policies to Avoid Contagion: Capital, Liquidity, Resolution, Money Market Mutual Fund Reform, and Limits on Short-Term Funding -
14 Capital Requirements: Basel III Framework -
15 Liquidity Requirements -
16 Bank Resolution Procedures, Contingent Capital (CoCos), and Bail-Ins -
17 Dodd–Frank Orderly Liquidation for Nonbank SIFIs (Including Bank Holding Companies) -
18 Living Wills -
19 Money Market Mutual Fund Reform -
20 Dependence of the Financial System on Short-Term Funding -
21 Government Crowding Out of Private Issuance of Short-Term Debt -
V Public Capital Injections into Insolvent Financial Institutions -
22 Capital Purchase Program and Other TARP Support Programs -
23 Criticisms of Bailouts Generally -
24 Specific Criticisms of TARP -
25 Standing Bailout Programs -
26 Conclusion - Appendix
- Index
Bank Resolution Procedures, Contingent Capital (CoCos), and Bail-Ins
Bank Resolution Procedures, Contingent Capital (CoCos), and Bail-Ins
- Chapter:
- (p.189) 16 Bank Resolution Procedures, Contingent Capital (CoCos), and Bail-Ins
- Source:
- Connectedness and Contagion
- Author(s):
Hal S. Scott
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
If capital and liquidity are the wings to address contagion, better insolvency resolution procedures for banking organizations and other financial institutions are the prayer. Effective resolution procedures are primarily designed to address the “too big to fail” (TBTF) problem by allowing banking organizations or other covered financial institutions to be resolved without public support. This chapter discusses the principal components of the new resolution system, contingent convertible capital instruments (CoCos) and bail-ins. The term “contingent capital” refers to a group of long-term hybrid debt instruments. The distinguishing characteristic of all contingent capital instruments is an embedded equity mandatory conversion provision, triggered automatically after the issuer's financial profile deteriorates below a defined threshold. These instruments are thus designed to provide more capital when needed so as to avoid formal resolution. Creditor bail-in transforms the basic loss absorbing functionality of contingent capital instruments into a more general and noncontractual method for restructuring a financial institution's liabilities without going through an extended resolution process.
Keywords: insolvency resolution, financial regulation, contingent convertible capital instruments, creditor bail-ins, contingent capital
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- Title Pages
- Dedication
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
-
I Connectedness, Contagion, and Correlation: Definitions and a Review of the Economic Literature -
1 The Concept of Connectedness -
2 The Concept and History of Contagion -
3 The Concept of Correlation -
II Connectedness in the Crisis -
4 Asset Connectedness: Lehman and AIG -
5 Liability Connectedness: Money Market Funds and Tri-Party Repo Market -
6 Dodd–Frank Act Policies to Address Connectedness -
III Contagion -
7 Contagion in the 2008 Crisis: The Run on the Nonbank Sector, “Shadow Banks” -
8 History of Lender of Last Resort in the United States -
9 Dodd–Frank Restrictions on the Lender-of-Last-Resort Power -
10 Comparison of LLR Powers of Fed with Bank of England, European Central Bank, and Bank of Japan -
11 Strengthening the LLR Powers of the Fed -
12 Liability Insurance and Guarantees -
13 Insuring Money Market Funds -
IV Ex ante Policies to Avoid Contagion: Capital, Liquidity, Resolution, Money Market Mutual Fund Reform, and Limits on Short-Term Funding -
14 Capital Requirements: Basel III Framework -
15 Liquidity Requirements -
16 Bank Resolution Procedures, Contingent Capital (CoCos), and Bail-Ins -
17 Dodd–Frank Orderly Liquidation for Nonbank SIFIs (Including Bank Holding Companies) -
18 Living Wills -
19 Money Market Mutual Fund Reform -
20 Dependence of the Financial System on Short-Term Funding -
21 Government Crowding Out of Private Issuance of Short-Term Debt -
V Public Capital Injections into Insolvent Financial Institutions -
22 Capital Purchase Program and Other TARP Support Programs -
23 Criticisms of Bailouts Generally -
24 Specific Criticisms of TARP -
25 Standing Bailout Programs -
26 Conclusion - Appendix
- Index