- Title Pages
- Dedication
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
-
I Connectedness, Contagion, and Correlation: Definitions and a Review of the Economic Literature -
1 The Concept of Connectedness -
2 The Concept and History of Contagion -
3 The Concept of Correlation -
II Connectedness in the Crisis -
4 Asset Connectedness: Lehman and AIG -
5 Liability Connectedness: Money Market Funds and Tri-Party Repo Market -
6 Dodd–Frank Act Policies to Address Connectedness -
III Contagion -
7 Contagion in the 2008 Crisis: The Run on the Nonbank Sector, “Shadow Banks” -
8 History of Lender of Last Resort in the United States -
9 Dodd–Frank Restrictions on the Lender-of-Last-Resort Power -
10 Comparison of LLR Powers of Fed with Bank of England, European Central Bank, and Bank of Japan -
11 Strengthening the LLR Powers of the Fed -
12 Liability Insurance and Guarantees -
13 Insuring Money Market Funds -
IV Ex ante Policies to Avoid Contagion: Capital, Liquidity, Resolution, Money Market Mutual Fund Reform, and Limits on Short-Term Funding -
14 Capital Requirements: Basel III Framework -
15 Liquidity Requirements -
16 Bank Resolution Procedures, Contingent Capital (CoCos), and Bail-Ins -
17 Dodd–Frank Orderly Liquidation for Nonbank SIFIs (Including Bank Holding Companies) -
18 Living Wills -
19 Money Market Mutual Fund Reform -
20 Dependence of the Financial System on Short-Term Funding -
21 Government Crowding Out of Private Issuance of Short-Term Debt -
V Public Capital Injections into Insolvent Financial Institutions -
22 Capital Purchase Program and Other TARP Support Programs -
23 Criticisms of Bailouts Generally -
24 Specific Criticisms of TARP -
25 Standing Bailout Programs -
26 Conclusion - Appendix
- Index
Money Market Mutual Fund Reform
Money Market Mutual Fund Reform
- Chapter:
- (p.223) 19 Money Market Mutual Fund Reform
- Source:
- Connectedness and Contagion
- Author(s):
Hal S. Scott
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
Prime money market mutual funds (MMF) are particularly susceptible to runs given the inherently short-term nature of their liabilities and the riskiness of their assets as compared with government funds. Thus, it is a proper object of policy to minimize the possibility of prime money market fund runs. This chapter discusses the SEC's approach to MMF reform. The approach incorporates three elements: (1) enhanced liquidity requirements; (2) a floating net asset value (NAV) requirement for certain classes of money market funds; and (3) the possibility of imposing liquidity fees and redemption gates on money market funds, which would limit rapid MMF creditor outflows in times of stress. It specifically rejected imposing a capital requirement on these funds. At the outset it should be clear that the concern with contagion should only be with prime money market funds and municipal funds, and not with government funds, which are all but immune from runs.
Keywords: financial regulation, regulatory reform, prime money market mutual funds, liquidity requirements, SEC, Securities and Exchange Commission, monetary policy, money market funds, net asset value
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- Title Pages
- Dedication
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
-
I Connectedness, Contagion, and Correlation: Definitions and a Review of the Economic Literature -
1 The Concept of Connectedness -
2 The Concept and History of Contagion -
3 The Concept of Correlation -
II Connectedness in the Crisis -
4 Asset Connectedness: Lehman and AIG -
5 Liability Connectedness: Money Market Funds and Tri-Party Repo Market -
6 Dodd–Frank Act Policies to Address Connectedness -
III Contagion -
7 Contagion in the 2008 Crisis: The Run on the Nonbank Sector, “Shadow Banks” -
8 History of Lender of Last Resort in the United States -
9 Dodd–Frank Restrictions on the Lender-of-Last-Resort Power -
10 Comparison of LLR Powers of Fed with Bank of England, European Central Bank, and Bank of Japan -
11 Strengthening the LLR Powers of the Fed -
12 Liability Insurance and Guarantees -
13 Insuring Money Market Funds -
IV Ex ante Policies to Avoid Contagion: Capital, Liquidity, Resolution, Money Market Mutual Fund Reform, and Limits on Short-Term Funding -
14 Capital Requirements: Basel III Framework -
15 Liquidity Requirements -
16 Bank Resolution Procedures, Contingent Capital (CoCos), and Bail-Ins -
17 Dodd–Frank Orderly Liquidation for Nonbank SIFIs (Including Bank Holding Companies) -
18 Living Wills -
19 Money Market Mutual Fund Reform -
20 Dependence of the Financial System on Short-Term Funding -
21 Government Crowding Out of Private Issuance of Short-Term Debt -
V Public Capital Injections into Insolvent Financial Institutions -
22 Capital Purchase Program and Other TARP Support Programs -
23 Criticisms of Bailouts Generally -
24 Specific Criticisms of TARP -
25 Standing Bailout Programs -
26 Conclusion - Appendix
- Index