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Connectedness and ContagionProtecting the Financial System from Panics$
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Hal S. Scott

Print publication date: 2016

Print ISBN-13: 9780262034371

Published to MIT Press Scholarship Online: January 2017

DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262034371.001.0001

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Government Crowding Out of Private Issuance of Short-Term Debt

Government Crowding Out of Private Issuance of Short-Term Debt

Chapter:
(p.239) 21 Government Crowding Out of Private Issuance of Short-Term Debt
Source:
Connectedness and Contagion
Author(s):

Hal S. Scott

Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:10.7551/mitpress/9780262034371.003.0021

It has been suggested that the government should increase the effective supply of public short-term debt in order to meet the demand by institutional cash managers for safe short-term debt. If the government eliminated private issuance of short-term debt by issuing enough public short-term debt to satisfy this demand, then there could be no runs and no contagion. The same result could be achieved if the remaining short-term debt of the financial system was so small that runs would not be significant. These policies can be characterized as “crowding out” private short-term debt. This chapter discusses crowding out by the Treasury and the Federal Reserve. The Treasury could crowd out runnable private short-term debt by replacing a certain amount of long-term Treasury debt issuance with shorter term Treasury debt. Investors that would otherwise buy and hold private short-term debt would instead buy Treasuries. The Federal Reserve could “crowd out” private short-term debt, using its new tools of monetary policy—interest on excess reserves (IOER) and reverse repurchase agreements (RRPs).

Keywords:   public short-term debt, short-term funding, Treasury Department, Federal Reserve, financial policy, financial regulation, monetary policy, excess reserves, reverse repurchase agreements

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