- Title Pages
- Dedication
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- I Connectedness, Contagion, and Correlation: Definitions and a Review of the Economic Literature
- 1 The Concept of Connectedness
- 2 The Concept and History of Contagion
- 3 The Concept of Correlation
- II Connectedness in the Crisis
- 4 Asset Connectedness: Lehman and AIG
- 5 Liability Connectedness: Money Market Funds and Tri-Party Repo Market
- 6 Dodd–Frank Act Policies to Address Connectedness
- III Contagion
- 7 Contagion in the 2008 Crisis: The Run on the Nonbank Sector, “Shadow Banks”
- 8 History of Lender of Last Resort in the United States
- 9 Dodd–Frank Restrictions on the Lender-of-Last-Resort Power
- 10 Comparison of LLR Powers of Fed with Bank of England, European Central Bank, and Bank of Japan
- 11 Strengthening the LLR Powers of the Fed
- 12 Liability Insurance and Guarantees
- 13 Insuring Money Market Funds
- IV Ex ante Policies to Avoid Contagion: Capital, Liquidity, Resolution, Money Market Mutual Fund Reform, and Limits on Short-Term Funding
- 14 Capital Requirements: Basel III Framework
- 15 Liquidity Requirements
- 16 Bank Resolution Procedures, Contingent Capital (CoCos), and Bail-Ins
- 17 Dodd–Frank Orderly Liquidation for Nonbank SIFIs (Including Bank Holding Companies)
- 18 Living Wills
- 19 Money Market Mutual Fund Reform
- 20 Dependence of the Financial System on Short-Term Funding
- 21 Government Crowding Out of Private Issuance of Short-Term Debt
- V Public Capital Injections into Insolvent Financial Institutions
- 22 Capital Purchase Program and Other TARP Support Programs
- 23 Criticisms of Bailouts Generally
- 24 Specific Criticisms of TARP
- 25 Standing Bailout Programs
- 26 Conclusion
- Appendix
- Index
Standing Bailout Programs
Standing Bailout Programs
- Chapter:
- (p.279) 25 Standing Bailout Programs
- Source:
- Connectedness and Contagion
- Author(s):
Hal S. Scott
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
This chapter discusses standing bailout programs in the EU and Japan. In the EU, as a result of the eurozone crisis, and in Japan as a result of the lost decade, standing support programs have been created that can be used to bail out failing banks, and in the case of Japan nonbanks as well, in the future. In June 2012, the European Council agreed to create a banking union that would allow for centralized supervision by the European Central Bank (ECB) of large banks through the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and centralized resolution of euro area banks through the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). The EU also created a new permanent bailout mechanism in 2010, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), primarily intended to bailout sovereigns. In Japan, the government has standing authority to use public funds to recapitalize solvent banks and solvent financial institutions. The Japanese government further has the authority to nationalize insolvent banks and to provide limited assistance to insolvent financial companies. The government is also permitted to nationalize an insolvent financial institution following a systemic risk determination.
Keywords: financial policy, financial regulation, bailout programs, European Union, Japan, monetary policy, financial crisis
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- Title Pages
- Dedication
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- I Connectedness, Contagion, and Correlation: Definitions and a Review of the Economic Literature
- 1 The Concept of Connectedness
- 2 The Concept and History of Contagion
- 3 The Concept of Correlation
- II Connectedness in the Crisis
- 4 Asset Connectedness: Lehman and AIG
- 5 Liability Connectedness: Money Market Funds and Tri-Party Repo Market
- 6 Dodd–Frank Act Policies to Address Connectedness
- III Contagion
- 7 Contagion in the 2008 Crisis: The Run on the Nonbank Sector, “Shadow Banks”
- 8 History of Lender of Last Resort in the United States
- 9 Dodd–Frank Restrictions on the Lender-of-Last-Resort Power
- 10 Comparison of LLR Powers of Fed with Bank of England, European Central Bank, and Bank of Japan
- 11 Strengthening the LLR Powers of the Fed
- 12 Liability Insurance and Guarantees
- 13 Insuring Money Market Funds
- IV Ex ante Policies to Avoid Contagion: Capital, Liquidity, Resolution, Money Market Mutual Fund Reform, and Limits on Short-Term Funding
- 14 Capital Requirements: Basel III Framework
- 15 Liquidity Requirements
- 16 Bank Resolution Procedures, Contingent Capital (CoCos), and Bail-Ins
- 17 Dodd–Frank Orderly Liquidation for Nonbank SIFIs (Including Bank Holding Companies)
- 18 Living Wills
- 19 Money Market Mutual Fund Reform
- 20 Dependence of the Financial System on Short-Term Funding
- 21 Government Crowding Out of Private Issuance of Short-Term Debt
- V Public Capital Injections into Insolvent Financial Institutions
- 22 Capital Purchase Program and Other TARP Support Programs
- 23 Criticisms of Bailouts Generally
- 24 Specific Criticisms of TARP
- 25 Standing Bailout Programs
- 26 Conclusion
- Appendix
- Index
