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Invisible MindFlexible Social Cognition and Dehumanization$
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Lasana T. Harris

Print publication date: 2017

Print ISBN-13: 9780262035965

Published to MIT Press Scholarship Online: September 2017

DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262035965.001.0001

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Naive Scientists

Naive Scientists

(p.85) 5 Naive Scientists
Invisible Mind

Lasana T. Harris

The MIT Press

The fifth chapter presents a toy model for the development of social cognition based on psychology experiments that explore this ability in babies, infants and children. It explores when infants dissociate people from objects and other non-human agents, reviewing classical models in developmental psychology that describe these processes. It also explores the development of language, intentionality, and emotion in infants, highlighting commonalities and differences between these important components of social cognition. Finally, it addresses the theoretical debate between theory-theory and and simulation accounts of social cognition, before arguing for a more social psychological perspective that takes the social context into account.

Keywords:   Developmental psychology, Theory of mind, Simulationists, Theory-theory, Fritz Heider, Social cognition development, Inherent rational agent, Telelogical stance

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