Why the Single State Conception Does Not Solve the Problem of Phenomenal Unity
Why the Single State Conception Does Not Solve the Problem of Phenomenal Unity
This chapter discusses a common conception of phenomenal unity, the single state conception (SSC). The intuition underlying SSC is that phenomenal unity goes along with the existence of a single conscious state that encompasses all of the subject’s phenomenal parts. A prominent example of SSC is Tim Bayne’s mereological account of phenomenal unity. It is argued that SSC does not solve the problem of phenomenal unity (PPU). Instead, it raises questions which pose additional problems. Moreover, these problems do not help to make progress on PPU, but can be regarded as red herrings.
Keywords: Single state conception, Tim Bayne, Mereological account, Phenomenal unity
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