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The Design of Climate Policy$
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Roger Guesnerie and Henry Tulkens

Print publication date: 2008

Print ISBN-13: 9780262073028

Published to MIT Press Scholarship Online: August 2013

DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262073028.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM MIT PRESS SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.mitpress.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright The MIT Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in MITSO for personal use.date: 13 October 2019

Cooperation, Stability, and Self-enforcement in International Environmental Agreements: A Conceptual Discussion

Cooperation, Stability, and Self-enforcement in International Environmental Agreements: A Conceptual Discussion

Chapter:
(p.164) (p.165) 8 Cooperation, Stability, and Self-enforcement in International Environmental Agreements: A Conceptual Discussion
Source:
The Design of Climate Policy
Author(s):

Parkash Chander

Henry Tulkens

Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:10.7551/mitpress/9780262073028.003.0008

This chapter reviews various notions of stability and related concepts used in a game theory that provide guidance on international environmental agreements (IEAs). It distinguishes between the economic rationale for cooperation and theory of cooperative games. The chapter also examines the concept of self-enforcement in international environmental agreements.

Keywords:   stability, game theory, international environmental agreements, IEAs, cooperation, cooperative games, self-enforcement

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