Simple Realism: The Naive Approach to Truth and Ontology
Simple Realism: The Naive Approach to Truth and Ontology
This chapter focuses on the position referred to as simple commonsense metaphysical realism—one that initially puts common sense naturally at odds with austere realism regarding what exists and what constitutes truth. It is said that common sense reflects naively on matters of ontology and semantics, emphasizing the fact that its position at the beginning of ontological inquiry is an initial position. This reflective position eventually leads to refinement as common sense goes through the antithesis stage and the synthesis stage, where it comes into tension with itself and then overcomes this internal tension, respectively. Spelling out the ontological and semantic theses of simple realism and underscoring the incompatibility between these theses and austere realism initiates the dialectical progression examined in this chapter.
Keywords: commonsense metaphysical realism, austere realism, ontology, semantics, antithesis stage, synthesis stage, simple realism, dialectical progression
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