This book is primarily concerned with the concept of austere realism, specifically a version of it referred to as blobjectivism. Austere realism claims that the right ontology is austere in the sense that it excludes numerous putative objects, properties, and relations that are posited in ordinary belief and discourse, and it also excludes many that are posited in scientific theorizing. Blobjectivism, on the other hand, claims that the world contains no real parts, but it is nevertheless structurally rich and dynamical. It implies that we are speaking of an object with a relevant structure, namely the structure of world, to which it is identical. Although they may seem implausible at first glance, both austere realism and blobjectivism are commonsensical, and are actually compatible with each other. The former consists of several ontological and semantic theses; the latter embraces all of these and adds its own specific ontological claims.
MIT Press Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.
If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.
To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs, and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us.