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Functions in Biological and Artificial WorldsComparative Philosophical Perspectives$
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Ulrich Krohs and Peter Kroes

Print publication date: 2009

Print ISBN-13: 9780262113212

Published to MIT Press Scholarship Online: August 2013

DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262113212.001.0001

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Being For: A Philosophical Hypothesis About the Structure of Functional Knowledge

Being For: A Philosophical Hypothesis About the Structure of Functional Knowledge

Chapter:
(p.167) 10 Being For: A Philosophical Hypothesis About the Structure of Functional Knowledge
Source:
Functions in Biological and Artificial Worlds
Author(s):

Giacomo Romano

Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:10.7551/mitpress/9780262113212.003.0010

This chapter describes the user's capacity to conceptualize the function that a designer intended for an artifact and the role that that function plays in distinguishing between artifactual and natural objects. It proposes the hypothesis that the human cognitive apparatus comprises a Functional Stance. It also explains some ideas that could be useful when giving a more satisfactory characterization of the Design Stance. This chapter shows that the functional knowledge could be a specialized and basic constitutive component of the more general attitude of the human mind to categorize the objects of this world into artifacts and natural entities.

Keywords:   artifactual, natural objects, human cognitive apparatus, Functional Stance, Design Stance, functional knowledge, human mind

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