- Title Pages
- Series Foreword
- Preface
- 1 Philosophical Perspectives on Organismic and Artifactual Functions
- II Bridging Functions of Organisms and Artifacts
- 2 Changing the Mission of Theories of Teleology: DOs and DON’Ts for Thinking About Function
- 3 Biological and Cultural Proper Functions in Comparative Perspective
- 4 How Biological, Cultural, and Intended Functions Combine
- 5 On Unification: Taking Technical Functions as Objective (and Biological Functions as Subjective)
- III Functions and Normativity
- 6 Functions and Norms
- 7 The Inherent Normativity of Functions in Biology and Technology
- 8 Conceptual Conservatism: The Case of Normative Functions
- 9 Ecological Restoration: From Functional Descriptions to Normative Prescriptions
- IV Functions and Classification
- 10 Being For: A Philosophical Hypothesis About the Structure of Functional Knowledge
- 11 Realism and Artifact Kinds
- 12 A Device-Oriented Definition of Functions of Artifacts and Its Perspectives
- V Evolutionary Perspectives
- 13 The Open Border: Two Cases of Concept Transfer from Organisms to Artifacts
- 14 Innovation and Population
- 15 The Cost of Modularity
- 16 Technical Artifacts, Engineering Practice, and Emergence
- Contributors
- Index
Conceptual Conservatism: The Case of Normative Functions
Conceptual Conservatism: The Case of Normative Functions
- Chapter:
- (p.127) 8 Conceptual Conservatism: The Case of Normative Functions
- Source:
- Functions in Biological and Artificial Worlds
- Author(s):
Paul Sheldon Davies
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
This chapter argues that biologists who cling to function talk are suffering from “conceptual conservatism” and that function talk should be given up. It addresses that the concept of normative functions is theorized. With respect to a wide range of similarly dubious concepts, it suggests that the commitment to conceptual conservatism is abandoned. It concentrates on the core commitment of all conservatives, not the differences in degree among them. This chapter shows that any concept dubious by descent or by psychological role ought to be divested of its former authority in the way the intellectual tasks are formulated.
Keywords: conceptual conservatism, normative functions, conservatives, authority, intellectual tasks
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- Title Pages
- Series Foreword
- Preface
- 1 Philosophical Perspectives on Organismic and Artifactual Functions
- II Bridging Functions of Organisms and Artifacts
- 2 Changing the Mission of Theories of Teleology: DOs and DON’Ts for Thinking About Function
- 3 Biological and Cultural Proper Functions in Comparative Perspective
- 4 How Biological, Cultural, and Intended Functions Combine
- 5 On Unification: Taking Technical Functions as Objective (and Biological Functions as Subjective)
- III Functions and Normativity
- 6 Functions and Norms
- 7 The Inherent Normativity of Functions in Biology and Technology
- 8 Conceptual Conservatism: The Case of Normative Functions
- 9 Ecological Restoration: From Functional Descriptions to Normative Prescriptions
- IV Functions and Classification
- 10 Being For: A Philosophical Hypothesis About the Structure of Functional Knowledge
- 11 Realism and Artifact Kinds
- 12 A Device-Oriented Definition of Functions of Artifacts and Its Perspectives
- V Evolutionary Perspectives
- 13 The Open Border: Two Cases of Concept Transfer from Organisms to Artifacts
- 14 Innovation and Population
- 15 The Cost of Modularity
- 16 Technical Artifacts, Engineering Practice, and Emergence
- Contributors
- Index
