Free Will as a Social Institution
Free Will as a Social Institution
This chapter examines consciousness as a social institution rather than a naturally given mental capacity. More specifically, it views consciousness as a matter of social construction and not as brute fact of nature. In this sense, consciousness is causally efficacious for the control of behavior, regardless of what the neuroscience suggests. The chapter considers whether consciousness causes behavior in the context of voluntary action, volition, and free will. It also discusses moral evaluation of action, how the concept of free will lines up with maxims of scientific psychology, the distinction between perception and reality, causal closure and determinism, indeterminism and waiving explanation, and action-decisions. The chapter concludes with broad perspectives on conscious experience and consciousness.
Keywords: consciousness, social institution, behavior, voluntary action, volition, free will, perception, reality, determinism, indeterminism
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