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Does Consciousness Cause Behavior?$
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Susan Pockett, William P. Banks, and Shaun Gallagher

Print publication date: 2006

Print ISBN-13: 9780262162371

Published to MIT Press Scholarship Online: August 2013

DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262162371.001.0001

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Intentions, Actions, and the Self

Intentions, Actions, and the Self

(p.39) 3 Intentions, Actions, and the Self
Does Consciousness Cause Behavior?

Suparna Choudhury

Sarah-Jayne Blakemore

The MIT Press

This chapter examines the neurological mechanisms by which we recognize actions as our own and how a sense of self may emerge from action. It considers how we feel in control of our actions and the ability to attribute one’s own actions to the self. It discusses evidence from studies that have explored our consciousness of the consequences of our actions and how this “self-monitoring” system distinguishes between self and other. In particular, it reviews psychological research on the conscious experience of willed action and neurophysiological experiments that probed its possible underlying processes. In addition, it looks at studies of patients with disorders of volition to illustrate how disruption of the self-monitoring system may disturb the normal experiential link between intention and the awareness of volitional control.

Keywords:   self, action, self-monitoring system, volition, willed action, intention, volitional control, consciousness

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